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This paper provides the first detailed examination of momentum effect in Australian 
equity market. In contrast to previous research, we find that momentum effect has not been 
present in Australian market since late 1970s. We argue that previous research found strong 
momentum effect because they assumed perfect foresight of future delisting or acquisitions in 
the sampling process. In addition, we find that Fama and French three-factor model cannot 
explain the mean momentum returns although it can fully rationalize the returns on winners and 
losers portfolios. Our findings raise awareness in the literature that momentum effect is not 
robust to different sampling methods. We contribute an alternative explanation to momentum 
returns documented in existing literature. Momentum effect could be a product of look-ahead 
bias incurring from the sampling techniques. More importantly, we provide supports to the 
efficient market hypothesis at weak form. 
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Abstract 
This paper provides the first detailed examination of momentum effect in Australian 
equity market. In contrast to previous research, we find that momentum effect has not been 
present in Australian market since late 1970s. We argue that previous research found strong 
momentum effect because they assumed perfect foresight of future delisting or acquisitions in 
the sampling process. In addition, we find that Fama and French three-factor model cannot 
explain the mean momentum returns although it can fully rationalize the returns on winners and 
losers portfolios. Our findings raise awareness in the literature that momentum effect is not 
robust to different sampling methods. We contribute an alternative explanation to momentum 
returns documented in existing literature. Momentum effect could be a product of look-ahead 
bias incurring from the sampling techniques. More importantly, we provide supports to the 
efficient market hypothesis at weak form. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is believed that in an efficient market, prices fully and instantaneously reflect all 
available relevant information. This means that investors cannot earn abnormal profits based on 
the information that is publicly known to the market including historical prices. However, the 
efficient market hypotheses have been challenged by a simple trading strategy called momentum. 
Momentum strategies buy the best performing stocks over the past three to twelve months and 
sell the worst performing stocks over the same period. The investment strategies appear to be 
simple but consistently profitable both economically and statistically in several equity markets. 
The presence of momentum effect is unpleasant evidence against market efficiency. 
Several noticeable explanations for the momentum effect are behavioral theories, risk-based 
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models and even the attack of “data snooping”. The evidence is so robust that believers in 
efficient markets are not able to explain. For this reason, it is not unexpected that the momentum 
literature has rapidly grown to be one of the most controversial and contemporary topics in 
modern finance. 
Since the seminal publication of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documented a significant 
momentum profit in United States (US) equity markets, there has been a growing body of 
literature showing that the momentum effect is also present across international markets outside 
the US (Rouwenhorst, 1998; Griffin et al., 2003 and Chui et al., 2000, 2010). However, a market 
that stands out from the crowd is the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) where the presence of 
the momentum effect has not gained consensus in the literature. Given that the Australian market 
is small enough to be an out-of-sample test but large enough to attract interests of researchers 
and practitioners, it is surprising that momentum studies in Australia are limited in terms of 
quantity and scope. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it is the first to examine 
the impact of survivorship bias on the findings of momentum effect. Previous research either 
assumes “perfect foresight” of future delisting or acquisitions (e.g. Grundy and Martin, 2001, 
Demir et al., 2004 and Galariotis, 2010) or does not mention solutions to such bias. To explore 
this impact, we follow the methodology of Henker et al. (2006) to realistically relax the perfect-
foresight assumption. We find no evidence of momentum effect in the ASX from 1977 to 2008. 
We are able to replicate previous studies with the look-ahead assumption in place and produce 
comparable momentum returns. This leads us to argue that momentum effect is not robust to 
different sampling methods and the survivorship bias may cause significant momentum profits 
documented in the literature. Secondly, we examine the explanatory power of Fama and French 
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(1993) three-factor model on momentum returns. We construct the Fama-French three factors 
from a large sample which covers 86% of ASX listed stocks from 1993 to 2008. This allows us 
to produce a detailed and robust examination of Fama and French three-factor model in Australia 
that is comparable to overseas findings. Finally, this study examines both non-overlapping and 
overlapping momentum portfolios. Research in Australia is limited to the examination of non-
overlapping portfolios. Thus, the question of the robustness of overlapping portfolios suggested 
in Jegadeesh and Titman, (1993, 2001) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) is still unclear. 
 This paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines previous research and 
explores the equivocal findings in Australian momentum literature. Section 3 and 4 will then 
discuss the data and methodology respectively. Results are presented in section 5 and section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Hurn and Pavlov (2003) are among the first to study the momentum effect in Australia. 
They source their monthly data for the period December 1973 to December 1998 from the 
Center for Research in Finance (CRIF) at the University of New South Wales. Because the 
majority of stocks listed on the ASX are small and illiquid stocks, they limit their sample to the 
top 200 stocks by market capitalization. Despite this restriction, their final dataset still has a 
considerable number of months when stocks are not traded and hence no return is recorded.
1
 The 
authors offer three solutions to the problem of missing values. The first approach is also used by 
CRIF database and ASX to construct market indices. If a stock is not traded in a particular 
month, the last recorded price is used to calculate returns. All missing period returns were thus 
                                                          
1
 Many studies collect data from CRIF, but only Hurn and Pavlov (2003) mention and offer solutions to the bias 
resulting from missing values in CRIF database. The study does not consider the effect of survivorship bias in the 
sampling methodology. 
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set to 0. The second approach is to replace any missing returns with the sample mean returns for 
each stock using the monthly total return observations. This method inherently biases returns 
upward.  Their third solution is to perform a regression of a three-factor model. They identify the 
appropriate factors by conducting a principle component analysis of size-sorted portfolio returns. 
As such, all listed stocks in the CRIF database are ordered on size and the 200 largest stocks are 
grouped into 10 portfolios. Hurn and Pavlov report that the first two factors are market and size 
factors commonly encountered in the literature. Due to the lack of historical book-to-market 
ratios, they cannot interpret the third factor as the excess return on value stocks or the Fama and 
French (1993) book-to-market factor. Instead, Hurn and Pavlov capture the additional variation 
in returns on equal-weighted industry portfolios (the third factor). Consequently, the missing 
returns are then replaced with the estimated returns from their three-factor regression. This 
method is dependent on the accuracy of the three factors.  
Following the methodology described in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Hurn and Pavlov 
(2003) find that the momentum effect is only present in the short to medium term. In particular, 
momentum returns vary from 0.6% to 2.73% per month for the strategies which rank stocks over 
6 months and hold them for 6 or 12 months.
2
 The profit of a winner minus loser portfolio 
becomes insignificant when the investment period is extended beyond 12 months. In addition, 
their findings are robust to the choice of the three methods of inferring missing return values. 
Hurn and Pavlov (2003) do not examine overlapping portfolios or allow for a skip period 
between the portfolio formation period and the holding period in their study. 
Demir et al. (2004) is the most commonly cited study in the Australian momentum 
literature. They contribute to the existing literature by investigating the momentum effect using 
                                                          
2
 By convention J/S/K denotes a J month ranking period, a K months holding period and S month skip period 
between J and K. 
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daily data. Their sample consists of stocks that are approved for short selling and all stocks in 
S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index for the period from July 1996 to July 2001. While Hurn and 
Pavlov (2003) examine the impact of bias caused by missing values in the sample, Demir et 
al.(2004) raise the survivorship bias issue. They delete stocks that do not survive on the first 2 
days of the holding period.
3
 Following the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), these 
authors examined all possible momentum strategies that rank and hold stocks over 30, 60, 90 and 
180 days. As with Hurn and Pavlov (2003), they do not examine overlapping portfolios or allow 
for a skip period between ranking and holding periods. Demir et al. find a very strong 
momentum effect with the best and the worst strategies earning monthly returns of 5.34% and 
1.38% per month, respectively. It should be noted that the magnitude of their momentum profits 
exceeds those commonly found in the Australian and US momentum literature. For the similar 
strategy implemented on stocks approved for short-selling it yields profits of about 1.76% per 
month which are statistically significant at the 99% level. Finally, Demir et al. also investigate 
the effect of size on momentum returns by forming size-neutral portfolios with stocks sorted 
bytheir market capitalization at the end of portfolio formation period. In contrast to Hurn and 
Pavlov (2003), they find that the momentum effect is strongest in smaller stocks and declines 
with market capitalization.  
Durand et al. (2006a) examine the momentum effect in Australia from January 1980 to 
December 2001. They use of broader sample of monthly data for all stocks listed on the ASX 
without mentioningthe survivorship bias issue. Durand et al. produce striking results in that 
momentum returns are insignificantly different from zero. For  some strategies such as 3/0/3, 
                                                          
3
 In overseas momentum literature, only Grundy and Martin (2001) mention the survivorship bias. They offer no 
solutions but delete stocks that ceased-to-trade from their sample. The bias in this method, as with Demir et al. 
(2004) and Galariotis (2010), is that it implicitly assumes “perfect foresight” of future delistings or acquisitions. 
Deleting such stocks from the sample may cause a bias toward finding momentum returns and makes the strategy 
not investible.  
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3/0/12 and 12/0/3, momentum traders actually incur a significant loss ranging from -2.612% to -
2.113% per month which are both economically and statistically significant. In order to reconcile 
the inconsistency, Durand et al. (2006a) replicated Demir et al. (2004) by considering daily 
(rather than monthly) returns for all stocks from 1990 to 2001. They find pronounced and 
statistically significant momentum effect. However, when examining the longer sample period 
from 1980 to 2001, the momentum effect is not evident. Consequently, Durand et al. (2006a) 
implicitly hypothesize that the difference between their study and Demir et al. (2004) is 
unrelated to the choice of sampling frequency but due to the different sample periods of the two 
studies. The authors do not examine their conjecture further. 
Brailsford and O'Brien (2008) also use a broad sample of stocks and a longer sample 
period. They employ CRIF market data of all stocks listed on ASX from 1979 to 2005. Their 
sample consists of 986 stocks per year which is larger than 675 stocks per year of Durand et al. 
(2006a). This also implies that their study include a significantly larger proportion of small 
stocks compared to others. Nevertheless, biases of missing values and delisted stocks are not 
mentioned in Brailsford and O‟Brien (2008). Brailsford and O'Brien (2008) find no evidence of 
momentum effect when stocks in portfolios are equally-weighted. However, when the authors 
form value-weighted momentum portfolios, the investing strategies become profitable with a 
return of 2.69% per month although the profits are primarily attributable to the loser portfolios 
(sell side). By categorizing stocks into four size groups, Brailsford and O‟Brien (2008) also find 
significant momentum returns of about 0.72% to 0.82% in the groups of top 50 stocks and 51-to-
200 stocks, respectively. The momentum effect weakens when they move down the size-groups 
and disappears for stocks ranked beyond 500. As with all prior Australian studies, Brailsford and 
O‟Brien (2008) do not examine overlapping portfolios. 
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Bettman, Maher and Sault (2009) apply the methodology of Barber and Lyon (1997) to 
match momentum portfolios based on size and book-to-market ratios from 1990 to 2007. They 
find that momentum strategies yield excess profits of 17.79% per year. Moreover, the significant 
returns are also robust to short-selling restrictions, liquidity constraints and bid-ask spreads on 
momentum profits. Finally, Bettman et al. (2009) document that investors earn average dollar 
profits of $14.46 million from executing Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum strategies in 
the ASX. Bettman et al. (2009) do not discuss the impact of survivorship bias in their study. 
The most recent study is Galariotis (2010) which confirms that momentum effect is 
strong and robust to sampling period and even exists in times of crisis. As with the literature, 
Galariotis (2010) assumes “perfect foresight” by deleting stocks that do not trade for three 
consecutive months in his sample. He also does not examine overlapping portfolios. The most 
notable contribution of Galariotis (2010) is the examination of three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993). In general, although he generally finds that the Fama and French three-factor 
model cannot explain momentum returns, the findings are mixed across various investing 
strategies. For a 6/0/6 strategy that is commonly examined in the literature, Galariotis (2010) 
finds that the Fama French three-factor model can fully explain momentum profits. This 
contrasts with the vast majority of studies in the US (e.g. Fama and French, 1996 and Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 2001). One possible reason for those inconsistent results is that Galariotis (2010) 
constructs the Fama and French three factors using book-to-market ratios of firms in the 
S&P/ASX200 index from 2000 to 2007. Thus, the sample is small with only 349 firms over the 
sample period. This suggests a need for a further examination of the Fama French three-factor 
model by employing all ASX listed stocks for a longer time period. Constructing Fama French 
three factors using the universe of ASX stocks is also suggested by Halliwell et al. (1999), 
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Durand et al. (2006b), O‟Brien et al. (2008) and Dempsey (2010) who examine the three factors 
in other research areas. Finally, it will also provide results which can be compared to those of 
overseas literature. 
In summary, the evidence of momentum effect in the Australian equity market is still 
equivocal. What is more certain is that the momentum effect is present in the biggest ASX 
companies by market capitalization. No momentum studies in Australia provide a complete 
examination of momentum portfolios which can be constructed using both non-overlapping and 
overlapping strategies. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) 
suggest that using overlapping portfolios helps reduce the effects of bid-ask bounce and hence 
provides more robust results. In practice, it is also more realistic that institutional investors revise 
their positions monthly. The impact of survivorship bias on the findings of momentum returns is 
also not explored although several studies notice in footnotes that the bias exists. Finally, the 
Australian literature also contains little evidence of the power of the Fama and French three 
factor model in explaining momentum returns, only Galariotis (2010) reports equivocal results.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. Accounting data 
The data employed in this study includes market data and accounting data. The 
constituent list and corresponding annual book values of total equity of all companies listed on 
the ASX from January 1993 to December 2008 are collected from Aspect Huntley‟s DataLink 
Financial database. The sample period starts after publication of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)An 
advantage of our study is that we sample in more recent years (from 1993 to 2008) when 
electronic database such as Aspect Financial can supply reliable quality of accounting data 
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(including total assets, total liabilities, and total shareholder equity) of all ASX-listed companies. 
We follow Fama and French (1993) to calculate total book values of equity and exclude firms 
with negative book as well as missing observations. On average, our sample comprises 1,552 
firms per year and a minimum of 905 firms in 1993 The number of firms increases to 1,826 
companies in 2008. In total, there are 251,249 observations over the sample period. Our sample 
covers approximately 86% of all firms in CRIF database.
4
 
Prior research that tests the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) on Australian 
equity returns is used to gauge the degree of coverage of our book-to-market ratios. O‟Brien et 
al. (2008) possesses the largest sample of book-to-market ratios which is hand-collected from 
1981 to 2005. Their data contains approximately 98% of all companies captured in CRIF. 
Although our sample size is smaller than O‟Brien et al. (2008), it is substantially increased over 
previous studies in Australia that also collect book values such as Halliwell, Heaney and Sawicki 
(1999), Gaunt (2004), Durack et al. (2004), Durand et al. (2006), Kassimatis (2008) and even the 
most recent study of Galariotis (2010). These studies cover less than 50% of all firms listed on 
ASX.
5
 To the best of our knowledge, the Aspect Financial database supplies the most 
comprehensive historical accounting data in Australia. 
 
  
                                                          
4
 Our sample is similar to that of Dempsey (2010) who also collects book values data from Aspect Financial 
database. In order to maintain the accuracy of our estimates, we only use data from 1993 to 2008 to construct the 
Fama French three factors since we notice that the quality of book values before was questionable. 
5
 Only Galariotis (2010) examines a Fama French three-factor model on momentum returns. Galariotis collects 
book-to-market data from Datastream International for S&P/ASX200 stocks from 2000 to 2009, with only 349 firms 
in his sample. See O‟Brien et al. (2008) for a comparison of sample size in Australian studies. O‟Brien et al. also 
argued that preceding studies‟ book-to-market values are fewer than 50% of all stocks listed on the ASX. 
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3.2. Market data 
Because there is no sole database offering both accounting and market data in Australia, 
we first collect accounting data of all ASX listed stocks from Aspect Huntley‟s and then use the 
list of stocks with accounting data to find the corresponding market values from CRIF.  The 
returns on stocks provided by CRIF are adjusted for changes to the number of shares 
outstanding, stock splits, stock dividends, spin-offs, stock distributions and rights issues. The 
CRIF database also contains monthly 13-week Treasury note yields and monthly market returns 
of all ASX stocks. Book-to-market ratios (book values from Aspect divided by the corresponding 
market values from CRIF) are then calculated for all ASX-listed companies at the end of the 
financial year (that is June). 
 Conrad and Kaul (1993) point out the upward bias to returns caused by including small 
stocks in the sample. They show that the reversion of returns on long-term contrarian strategies is 
due to the inclusion of small and low-priced stocks. For this reason, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) exclude stocks priced below $5 in their construction of momentum portfolios. The 
exclusion of such stocks ensures that the findings are not caused primarily by small and illiquid 
stocks or the bid-ask bounce. In Australia, Brailsford and O'Brien (2008) and other prior research 
confirm that the momentum effect can only be found in large and mid-cap stocks. These authors 
also suggest that momentum returns on mid-cap stocks are mainly attributable to the loser 
portfolios which contained small and illiquid stocks which may be difficult to short sell. The 
viability of momentum designs that consider the whole universe of stocks is therefore 
questionable. Since the majority of stocks listed on the ASX are illiquid, we argue that studies of 
momentum effect in Australia should not attempt to enlarge the sample to the universe of stocks 
if the intent is to show evidence for a profitable trading strategy. 
11 
 
Our objective in this study is to design momentum strategies that are institutionally 
investable. Consequently, we restrict our sample to the 300 largest stocks listed on the ASX 
(henceforth ASX300). In the investigation of the momentum effect, we extend the market data to 
cover from January 1977 to December 2008.
6
 The sample period allows us to examine 16 years 
pre-Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 16 years post-Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Thus, the 
results may tell whether publication of the first momentum findings study changed investors‟ 
trading behaviour. The final dataset contains 1,740 (live and dead) stocks that ever fall in the top 
ASX300. The constituent list is updated on a monthly basis. Stocks in the ASX300 are highly 
liquid that includes large-capitalization and mid-capitalization stocks.  
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that, consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), 
limiting our study to 300 largest stocks is roughly equivalent to excluding stocks priced below $1 
which are approximately 67% of the CRIF universe. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Construction of momentum portfolios 
The seminal paper of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) lays out the methodology to construct 
momentum portfolios that most momentum studies followed and this study is not an exception. 
Firstly, at beginning of each month, continuously compounded return on each stock are 
computed as a criterion to rank stocks over the past 𝐽 months. This ranking period is also called 
formation period. To be eligible for ranking, stocks must have a return history of 𝐽 months and 
be actively traded from the beginning to the end of formation period. The restriction is necessary 
since returns on stocks that are not actively traded at both endpoints cannot be computed. 
                                                          
6
 Momentum trading strategies will be discussed in the methodology section. For now, it should be noted that the 
strategies require a six months ranking period. Therefore we collect additional data for one year backward in time, 
1976. 
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Moreover, if the stocks are not traded at the end of formation period they cannot be purchased or 
sold and hence cannot be included in the relative-strength portfolios. This requirement does not 
induce any bias because all historical information is known prior to time t.  
Due to the relatively small number of stocks in the sample (300 stocks per month), we do 
not follow the US literature to group stocks into deciles. Instead, stocks are classified into 
quintiles where the top quintile includes the best performing stocks over the ranking period and 
is referred to as the winner portfolio. Correspondingly, the bottom quintile consists of the worst 
performing stocks over the same period and is referred to as the loser portfolio. Over the sample 
period each quintile contains 60 stocks. In the next 𝐾 months (referred to as holding or 
investment period), relative-strength or momentum strategies enter a long position in an equally 
weighted portfolio of winners and a short position in an equallyweighted loser portfolio. Hence, 
the momentum portfolios are also called zero-cost portfolios. Since the portfolios are equally 
weighted the holding period return of a momentum portfolio is the average of all individual stock 
returns within the portfolio. 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) document return reversals in the short term. In 
particular, they show that current losers are likely to become future winners and vice versa. Lo 
and MacKinlay (1990), on the other hand, argue that the existence of short-term reversals in 
many such studies is due to the bid-ask bounce. For this reason, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
avoid bid-ask spread, price pressure and lagged reaction effects by introducing a one-month skip 
period between formation and holding period. This convention has been followed by many 
subsequent momentum studies. We also use a one-month skip period in this study. Stocks are 
ranked based on their past J months return spanning from 𝑡 −  𝐽 to 𝑡 −  1 and the winner and 
loser portfolios are held from 𝑡 +  1 to 𝑡 + 𝐾 + 1.  
13 
 
To be consistent with the vast majority of momentum literature in the US and to increase 
the power of tests, we construct overlapping portfolios whereby additional new momentum 
portfolios are formed every month and held until time 𝑡 + 𝐾 + 1. At each month 𝑡, the winner 
(loser) return is the equally weighted return of the k winner (loser) portfolios corresponding to 
the 𝑡 –  𝑘 + 1 to 𝑡 months. The strategy entails that momentum portfolio of month 𝑡 will contain 
all securities that are in the winners and losers of month 𝐾 − 1 to month . Overlapping portfolios 
are used to increase the power of t-tests and allows simple t-statistics to be used. In addition, 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argued that the utilization of overlapping portfolios helps reduce 
the effects of the bid-ask bounce and hence provide a more robust result. In practice, it is also 
more realistic that institutional investors revise their position monthly. 
In choosing specific momentum strategies examined, previous research in Australia has 
shown that momentum returns are significant for strategies that rank stocks over the past 3 to 6 
months and hold them for 3 to 6 months (e.g. Hurn and Pavlov (2003), Demir et al. (2004) and 
Brailsford and O'Brien (2008)). The significant medium-term momentum effect is also 
consistently found in the US. As a result, this study only examines the strategies that use either a 
three-month or six-month ranking period. The returns on these strategies with non-overlapping 
and overlapping periods as well as an optional one-month skipping period are examined.  
Finally, since the weighting of the simutaneously held momentum portfolios changes 
over time due to the differential rates of return accruing to the different portfolios the  
momentum portfolios are not equallyweighted throughout the holding period. In order to 
maintain an equal portfolioweighting, we follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and rebalance the 
portfolios monthly to an equal weighting. This involves selling a proportion of those portfolios 
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with above average performance compared to those with a worse performance during the holding 
period. The proceeds will then be used to purchase the poorer performing portfolios. 
 
4.2. Controversy in handling biases 
There are cases where stocks are eligible to be considered in the formation period but 
cease to trade before the end of investment period. Grundy and Martin (2001) address this issue 
by deleting those stocks from their sample. They notice that when winners are delisted, it is 
typically the result of a merger or takeover during the formation period. The news about 
acquisitions is likely to cause the superior performance of those stocks during the formation 
period. In contrast, the losers are delisted because of liquidation or other negative performance 
related reasons. In Australia, Demir et al. (2004) impose similar requirement in the sample 
construction. Subsequent studies in Australia do not mention this portfolio selection issue. In the 
present study, we refer to this approach as „conventional sampling method‟. The approach 
implicitly assumes that investors possessed „perfect foresight‟ of future delistings and 
acquisitions and hence, do not include those stocks in their portfolios at time of portfolio 
formation. This presumption of foresight causes return biases in previous research. Since the 
objective of our study is to examine investable momentum returns, we will address this 
shortcoming.
7
  We adopt a conservative sampling method that is used in several studies (e.g. 
Henker, Martens and Huynh (2006) and Gaunt and Gray (2003)).
8
 If the stocks do not exist or 
trade by the time a new portfolio is formed (month 𝑡), they are not included in winner or loser 
portfolios since we cannot  acquire these securities to include them in any portfolio . This does 
                                                          
7
 It would be ideal if the data of delistings were available in Australia. This would allow us to obtain returns on 
stocks after they are delisted or acquired. However, there is no database such as CRSP (Center for Research in 
Security Prices) in the US that offers the data for the Australian market. 
8
 Gaunt and Gray (2003) study the short-term autocorrelation in Australian equities. They use a similar method to 
eliminate survivorship bias in their sample. 
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not induce bias since the information is known by the time of portfolio formation. For stocks that 
exist and trade in month 𝑡 but cease to exist in the subsequent months of the investment period, 
we assume that those stocks are liquidated and subsequently worthless. This means that their 
prices are set to zeros and returns on those stocks will then be -100% in the delisting month and 
zeros in the subsequent months. The momentum returns will be a lower bound of actual portfolio 
returns because it accounts properly for failed company returns and downward biases returns of 
portfolios containing acquired or merged companies.    
Although the approach is conservative, it is superior to the conventional sampling method 
because it does not require any foresight. The liquidating amount, if any, may be instead 
deposited into cash management account that in effect earns relatively insignificant returns for 
the rest of a holding period. In the present study, we refer to this way of handling the 
survivorship bias as „practical approach‟. By replicating previous research in the next section, we 
argue that ignoring such stocks leads to a significant bias towards finding a momentum effect. 
This bias may get worse in studies that employ a universe of ASX stocks since the large number 
of small stocks in their samples is more likely to be delisted or acquired. 
Besides a delisting bias, the CRIF database also suffers from a bias created bymissing 
returns when stocks are not traded on the final trading day of a month.
9
 These missing values are 
recorded as price relatives of -9 and -99 in the database. Although we have limited our study to 
the biggest 300 stocks on the ASX, the resultant dataset still contains a large number of 
observations with missing returns. Hurn and Pavlov (2003) suggest three solutions for handling 
these missing prices as discussed in the literature review. Since they find that different 
                                                          
9
 Such stocks record returns in following months. On average, the stocks with missing returns and delisted stocks 
together affect 7.84% (about 5stocks per holding period) of the winners and 13.45% (approximately 8 stocks per 
holding period) of the losers for the 6/0/6 overlapping portfolios from 1977 to 2008. The difference in these 
percentages is expected since winner stocks are larger and hence less likely to be delisted than loser stocks over 
time. 
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approaches produce similar results, we adopt their first simple method to impute missing returns 
with a return of zero for that month. This technique which is also used by the ASX and CRIF 
databases does not create a bias. 
 
4.3. Construction of Fama-and-French three factors 
The three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) consists of market risk factor 
(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓), the size factor (𝑆𝑀𝐵) and the book-to-market factor (𝐻𝑀𝐿). SMB, small minus big, 
captures the premium that small stocks earn over large ones while HML, high minus low, 
captures the premium that value stocks earn over growth stocks. There is no source for reliable 
Fama-and-French three factors of Australian companies.  Hence we follow the original 
methodology of Fama and French (1993) to construct the common risk factors for the companies 
in our sample. 
We notice that different Australian tests of the Fama and French three-factor model use 
different grouping methods in constructing the portfolios of size and book-to-market values. 
Some use quintiles of book-to-market ratios and size to group stocks (e.g. Halliwell, Heaney and 
Sawicki (1999)), some follow exactly the grouping method of Fama and French (1993) (e.g. 
Gaunt (2004)) while others classify the stocks into two groups (e.g. Faff (2004)).
10
 Those studies 
adjust the categorization of stocks because their sample sizes are small. As this study obtains the 
universe of ASX-listed stocks to construct the factors, the sample is sufficiently large to closely 
follow Fama and French (1993) in this matter. The exception is that we rank and classify stocks 
based on book-to-market values in June of each year 𝑡 (the end of fiscal year in Australia). 
                                                          
10
 See O‟Brien et al. (2008) for a discussion of different grouping methods. 
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To construct the size factor, in December of each year t from 1993 to 2008 and rank all 
ASX-listed stocks covered in the Aspect database by market capitalization.
11
 We then assign all 
stocks with market capitalization higher than the median of ASX market capitalization into the 
big portfolio, B,  and the rest into a small portfolio, S. Independently, all ASX stocks are also 
ranked on book to market values at the fiscal year end. We exclude all stocks with negative book 
values of equity. The stocks are categorized such that the first 30% of stocks (growth stocks) has 
the lowest book to market ratios, L; the next 40% of stocks is assigned to medium portfolio, M, 
and the remaining 30% of stocks (value stocks) comprise the high, H, portfolio. In the next step, 
we construct six intersection portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, and B/H). These portfolios are 
held for twelve months and monthly value-weighted returns on those six portfolios are computed 
from July of year 𝑡 to June of year 𝑡 + 1. The 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factors are then calculated as 
follows.
12
 
            𝑆𝑀𝐵 =
1
3
 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 +  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕   
            −
1
3
 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +  𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 +  𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕       (2)  
     𝐻𝑀𝐿 =
1
2
 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +  𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 −
1
2
 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕 +  𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕      (3) 
 Having constructed the Fama and French three factors, we next perform the following 
time-series regressions that subsequently examine the explanatory power of each of the three 
factors. The first time-series regression is one-factor model, capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
which regresses the returns on momentum portfolios against the market risk premium (equation 
4). We will then add the size (SMB) factor to the model (equation 5). Finally, a full set of Fama 
and French three-factor model is estimated on momentum returns (equation 6). The Fama and 
                                                          
11
 Refer to footnote 4. We only use momentum returns post-Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) from January 1993 to 
December 2008 when performing Fama-and-French three-factor regressions. 
12
 From Fama and French‟s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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French model is employed to examine the exposure of momentum returns to the three common 
factors of stock returns. Because previous research in the US has been rejecting the model, we 
expect to find similar findings in Australia. 
                        𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑒𝑝𝑡                   (4)  
                        𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑒𝑝𝑡                (5)  
                        𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑕𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑝𝑡              (6)      
 where 𝑟𝑓  is monthly yield on 13-week Treasury bill; (𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓) is the monthly momentum excess 
return (over the risk-free rate, 𝑟𝑓) on the market index;  𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓  is the excess return on the 
value-weighted market index; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is a portfolio representing the returns of small companies 
minus big ones; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is a portfolio representing returns of companies with high book-to-market 
ratios over those with low book-to-market ratios; and 𝑒𝑝𝑡  represents the error term in each of the 
regressions. 
 
4.4. Transaction costs 
The returns produced from the methodology outlined above would be overstated as 
transaction costs of implementing momentum strategies are not considered. In order to account 
for transaction costs the constituent list of securities in winners and losers are recorded each 
month. We then compute the number of stocks dropped from the old portfolios and added to the 
new portfolios. This allows us to calculate the turnover rates of winner and loser portfolios. 
Since the relevant data to calculate transaction costs is investor specific, transaction costs 
computed in the literature are employed. Specifically, we relied on the round-trip transaction 
costs calculated in Comerton-Forde, Fernandez, Frino and Oetomo (2005) and Comerton-Forde, 
Gallagher, Nahhas and Walter (2006) to adjust for our raw momentum returns. Using a unique 
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institutional trade dataset supplied by one of the top 10 investment managers in Australia, 
Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) documented execution costs associated with purchases and sales 
were 0.34% and 0.16%, respectively.
13
 Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) used similar methodology 
as the former study but with a larger sample that focused on 12 actively managed Australian 
small-cap funds in Australia. They reported higher transaction costs than Comerton-Forde et al. 
(2005) with round-trip transaction costs of 1.09% for a trade in a small-cap stock. We chose 
these two studies as representative cases for several reasons. Firstly, their studies used a more 
current sample period than the others. Further, each study employed different samples of sizes of 
institutions. Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) provided typical transaction costs for portfolios 
consisting of large companies while Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) supplied transaction costs for 
small company portfolios. Finally, both papers considered explicit costs (brokerage fees) and 
implicit costs (price impacts of trades).  
The cost-adjusted returns for momentum portfolios are calculated by subtracting the total 
round-trip transaction costs of both winners and losers from the raw momentum returns. For 
winner and loser portfolios, their corresponding round-trip transaction costs were subtracted 
from the raw returns. 
 
5. Results 
Using the bias-free sample, we find no momentum effect on the Australian equity market 
from 1977 to 2008. Since this is in stark contrast to the literature, we replicate previous research 
using the „conventional sampling approach‟ and find robust and consistent results to other studies. 
We show that the difference is due to our different sampling method which is more investible. In 
                                                          
13
 Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) contains only only one individual investment manager over a one-year period which 
may not be generalize to the entire market 
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addition, consistent with the literature, we document that the Fama-and-French three-factor model 
cannot explain the variation in momentum returns in Australia. Finally, we find that adjusting for 
transaction costs significantly reduces the returns of momentum portfolios under both, the 
conventional and practical, sampling methods. 
 
5.1. Momentum returns under practical sampling method 
Table 1 presents average monthly returns for non-overlapping momentum portfolios over 
the entire period from January 1977 to December 2008. Overall, we find that momentum 
investing strategies are not profitable or even making a loss in some holding periods. In all 
strategies, returns on both winners and loser portfolios are statistically significant and positive. 
Past losers outperform past winners by about 0.4% to 1% per month although the returns varied 
substantially for different formation and holding periods. For instance, the strategy ranking 
stocks over the past 6 months and holding the portfolio for 12 months with a one-month skip 
period (6/1/12) earns negative return of -1.03% per month, while the 6/1/6 strategy earns -0.04% 
per month. Portfolios allowing a one-month skip gap between ranking and holding periods 
produce similar statistically and economically insignificant results. 
<< Insert Table 1 here >>> 
To increase the power of student 𝑡 tests, we construct overlapping portfolios in which a 
momentum strategy is followed every month. Results are reported in table 2. Utilizing 
overlapping momentum portfolios does not change the earlier results. On average, momentum 
traders cannot earn significantly positive returns although both winner and loser portfolios 
exhibit a strong momentum effect. Indeed, consistent with existing arguments about the 
advantages of overlapping portfolios, we find that negative momentum returns are now more 
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robust and significant than before. Returns on winner-minus-loser portfolios are even more 
negative. Past losers again yield significantly positive returns and outperform their winner 
counterpart by approximately 1% per month. In other words, the losses are primarily caused by 
the good performance of the loser portfolio. For instance, strategies ranking stocks over the past 
6 months and holding them for 6 months produce a loss of 1.03% which is statistically 
significant at the 99% level. This loss is due to the loser portfolios which make an average return 
of 1.63% outperforming the winners by 1.03% per month. Finally, consistent with studies in the 
US, we document an increase in momentum returns (a smaller loss) when a one-month skip 
between ranking and holding periods is added. 
We notice that our findings are inconsistent with the research of Hurn and Pavlov (2003), 
Demir et al. (2004); Marshall and Cahan (2005) and Brailsford and O'Brien (2008). However, 
we support the findings of Durand et al. (2006) who find no momentum effect from 1980 to 
2001 using monthly data. In overseas momentum literature, we also support the findings of 
Henker, Martens and Huynh (2006) who employ a similar sampling method for US data from 
1993 to 2004 and find no evidence for a momentum effect.
14
 
<< Insert table 2 here >> 
Figure 1 further examines the negative returns of momentum portfolios. The chart shows 
a time series of 6-month holding period returns (HPR) of overlapping portfolios that are formed 
by ranking stocks over the past six months and holding them for six months with a one-month 
gap between formation and investment periods (6/1/6). Returns are highly volatile with negative 
returns in most months. The figure suggests that momentum returns are more volatile and 
                                                          
14
 Henker, Martens and Huynh (2006) do not replicate the „conventional sampling method‟. Rather, they reconcile 
the inconsistency by examining momentum return in sub-periods. Those authors find that US momentum effect is 
only present from 1993 to 2000 and becomes insignificant over entire sample period due to the technology crash 
from 2001 to 2004. Thus, the impact of the perfect-foresight assumption is also not explored in their study. 
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negative before January 1993. This suggests a further examination of momentum returns pre-
1993 and post-1993 (before and after Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) was published). 
<< Insert figure 1 here >> 
Table 3 presents the momentum returns in two sub-periods. The first sub-period is from 
1977 to 1992 and the second sub-period from 1993 to 2008. Consistent with our initial 
assessment, the volatility of momentum returns pre-1993 is 4.73% which is 1.56% higher than 
the volatility post-1993. This causes momentum returns of -1.37% in the first sub-period to be 
significant at the 99% level while the negative returns of -0.22% in the second sub-period is not 
significant.  
<< Insert table 3 here >> 
 
 
 
5.2. Momentum returns under conventional sampling method 
In order to reconcile our finding which are inconsistent with the literature and to show the 
impact of survivorship bias, we replicate the „conventional methodology‟ using the same sample 
as used before for the period from 1977 to 2008. As noted in Grundy and Martin (2001), the 
„conventional sampling approach‟ deletes stocks that have ceased to exist during the investment 
period. Returns on momentum portfolios after exclusion of those delisted stocks are reported in 
table 4.  
We findsignificantly positive momentum returns for all strategies with similar magnitude 
to previous research in Australia. Momentum strategies yield statistically significant returns 
ranging from 0.5% to 3% per month which is due to the good performance of past winners. For 
23 
 
non-overlapping portfolios reported in panel A, the most significant strategy is 3/0/12 yielding 
significant return of 1.47% per month. The least profitable strategies are 6/0/3 and 6/1/3 with 
returns of 0.25% and 0.22%, respectively.  
Returns of overlapping portfolios are reported in panel B of table 4. Consistently, our 
replication produces more robust results using overlapping strategies. Momentum profits are all 
positive and slightly higher after we allow for a one-month skip period between the portfolio 
formation and investment periods. The most profitable strategy is 6/1/3 with 0.87% per month 
which is significant at the 99% level while the least profitable strategy is 6/1/12 with 0.22% 
return. The magnitudes are again similar to existing findings. 
<< Insert table 4 here >> 
In Table 5 we analyze the profits of winner-minus-loser portfolios before and after 1993. 
Consistent with the findings in the previous section, we find a decrease in volatility of 
momentum returns from 4.19% pre-1993 to 3.07% post-1993. In addition, the momentum effect 
from 1977 to 1992 is also weak with a return of 0.55% which is significant at the 90% level. The 
weak significance is due to the high volatility in returns during the period. The momentum effect 
is much stronger in the post-1993 sub-period with a return of 0.91% which is significant at the 
99% level. This suggests that the positive returns documented in previous research can be 
attributed to the strong effect in the 1990s. 
<< Insert table 5 here >> 
To conclude, our replication results show that when the assumption of „perfect foresight‟ 
is in place, momentum trading strategies are as profitable. However, when the the alternate 
sampling strategy, the results reverse to a loss or even significant loss for some strategies. These 
findings are not attributed to the differences in sample coverage or the time period under 
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examination but to the different methods of handling companies that cease to exist. The foremost 
conclusion drawn from these results is that the momentum effect is not robust to different 
sampling methods. Assuming perfect foresight has a certain impact on findings of momentum 
effect and hence could not be ignored. We will use the „practical‟ results reported in tables 2 for 
the rest of this study. In particular, we will choose the strategy of 6-month/6-month with one-
month skip period to examine in detail. This is also consistent with the literature as 6/1/6 strategy 
was also examined in most momentum studies.
15
 
 
5.3. Factor sensitivity analysis 
This section analyzes the sensitivity of momentum returns on the three risk factors of 
Fama and French (1993) for the period post-Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Panel A, B and C of 
Table 6 presents time-series regressions of equations (4), (5) and (6).  
Panel A shows that after adjusting for market risk, winner portfolios earn a negative 
return of -0.25% while loser portfolios earn almost zero returns over the period. Both alphas of 
winners and losers are insignificantly different from zero. Consistent with Brailsford and O'Brien 
(2008), winner portfolios are slightly more exposed to movements of the market than the losers 
(An average beta of 0.93 for winners compared to 0.83 for losers). Betas of winners and losers 
are also statistically significant at the 99% level. Further, we notice that risk-adjusted returns of 
the relative-strength portfolios are still negative with -0.71% per month which is statistically 
significant at the 99% level. Comparing this return with the raw return of -0.75% per month 
                                                          
15
 In the first robustness check, we construct value-weighted momentum portfolios as in Brailsford and O‟Brien 
(2008). Second, we ranked stocks based on cumulative returns as suggested by Grundy and Martin (2001). Finally, 
geometric mean returns were employed as an alternative performance evaluation. In summary, our findings are 
robust to each of these checks. Momentum investors cannot on average profit from the arbitrage strategies once the 
perfect-foresight in portfolio selection was removed.As a robustness test for the length of perfect foresight, we 
follow Demir et al. (2004) and Galariotis (2010) to delete stocks that do not survive in the first month of the holding 
period. We find qualitatively consistent results that momentum returns are significant. 
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suggests that the adjustment for the market risk premium alone does not change the economic 
loss to momentum investors. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the market factor can explain 
returns of winners and losers as their corresponding alphas become statistically insignificant. 
Panel B reports the explanatory power of the two-factor model of equation (5). Winners 
are slightly more sensitive to the market risk factor than losers with betas of 0.91 and 0.81 
respectively. However, the losers are more exposed to the size factor with the loading of 0.093 
while winners‟ size loading is 0.083. The alpha of winners is significantly negative whereas the 
alpha of losers is now insignificantly negative. This means that the winners still do not 
outperform the losers under the two-factor model. In addition, the two factors are insignificant in 
explaining momentum returns. The risk-adjusted momentum profit is still negative and 
statistically significant. Adding the size factor does not improve the explanatory power of the 
model as the adjusted 𝑅2 of the two models are virtually equal. The 𝐹-statistic of the two-factor 
model is 1.09 which is not significant even at the 90% significance level. In other words, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that market risk and size are not jointly significant. The size loadings 
of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios are also similar to Brailsford and O‟Brien (2008). 
However, their model‟s adjusted 𝑅2 (0.3%) for the two-factor model is lower than ours. The 
difference in magnitude is probably due to different sample characteristics of their study. 
Panel ) presents the sensitivity of winners, losers and momentum portfolios to the three 
Fama and French common risk factors. Overall, the Fama and French three-factor model 
improves the explanatory power over the one factor model although it still explains little of the 
variation in momentum returns; the adjusted 𝑅2 increases to 5%. This level of adjusted R2 is 
consistent with O‟Brien et al. (2008) and Dempsey (2010). The 𝐹-statistic associated with the 
null of no significant dynamic behavior in momentum portfolios‟ Fama-French factor loadings is 
26 
 
78.94 which is significant at the 99% level. Loser portfolios are more sensitive to both size and 
book-to-market equity factors than winners. Stocks in the winner potfolio have an average size 
loading of 0.11 whereas those in the loser portfolio have an average sizeloading of 0.19. For the 
HML factor, winners have the loading of 0.07 (t-statistic = 1.58) whereas the loading of losers is 
0.21 (t-statistic = 3.33). These results indicate that loser portfolios are significantly riskier than 
their winner counterpart. Noticeably, the risk-adjusted returns of winners and losers become 
statistically insignificant, consistent with Fama and French (1996). The three-factor model still 
cannot explain all of the momentum returns. Similar to Fama and French (1996), the risk-
adjusted return is still significantly negative with -0.94% which is less than the raw returns of -
0.75% per month. The difference arises because losers are more sensitive to Fama and French 
factors. Finally, as documented in US studies (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Grundy and 
Martin (2001)), momentum portfolios have negative loadings on size and distress factors. They 
are also most exposed to the book-to-market factor with the loading of -0.14 (significant at 95% 
level).  
Inconsistent with our findings, Galariotis (2010) reports the Fama French risk-adjusted 
returns for a 6/0/6 strategy to be insignificantly positive.
16
 One possible reason for the difference 
is that Galariotis use a smaller sample of only 349 firms for a shorter time period, from 2000 to 
2007. Moreover, our sampling methodology is different. 
<< Insert table 6 here >> 
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 Galariotis (2010) finds mixed results on the explanatory power of Fama and French three-factor model. The risk-
adjusted returns are still significantly positive in other strategies such as 9/0/6 and 6/0/9. 
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5.4. Transaction costs 
Given that momentum returns reported from our sample are insignificant or even 
negative, there is little incentive for investors to pursue the strategies. Hence, examining the 
profitability net of transaction costs may not be as interesting as if the profits of momentum were 
significant. Nevertheless, as our replication results are comparable to prior findings, it is of 
interest to test whether momentum returns documented in previous research can overcome 
transaction costs. 
Consistent with the literature, the turnover of positions in the momentum strategy is much 
less than 100% per month (especially for overlapping portfolios) because there are common 
stocks between overlapping ranking periods (e.g. 5 common months for 6/1/6 overlapping 
portfolios). The majority of stocks that are classified as winners or losers in the current month, 𝑡, 
are still included in those portfolios for the next month, 𝑡 + 1. For the 6/1/6 overlapping strategy 
examined, the turnover rates of winners and losers are virtually equal from 1993 to 2008. On 
average, 33.915% of the stocks in the winner portfolio are sold at the end of the holding period 
while 33.681% of the stocks in the  loser portfolio have to be bought back at the end of the 
investment period. These figures are consistent with those in US studies such as Grundy and 
Martin (2001) who report turnover rates for winners and losers of 39.908% and 36.233%, 
respectively. 
Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) find that the round-trip 
transaction cost for large and small-cap managed funds whose trades had identical turnover rates 
of 67% are 0.5% and 1.09%, respectively. Given that our turnover rates for winners and losers 
are almost half of theirs, the corresponding trsansaction costs for our winners and losers 
portfolios are both equal to 0.25% of the portfolio value if we rely on the cost estimates of 
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Comerton-Forde et al. (2005). Using the estimates of Comerton-Forde et al. (2006), the 
corresponding round-trip transaction costs for winner and loser portfolios are 0.548% and 
0.552%, respectively. 
Table 7 reports the average returns on momentum portfolios from 1993 to 2008 after 
accounting for different transaction costs. Column 2 and 3 present momentum returns adjusted 
for transaction cost estimates of Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2006), 
respectively. Panel A compares results of raw returns (reported again in the first column) and 
cost-adjusted returns for 6/1/6 overlapping portfolios constructed using our sample. Returns of 
Winner and loser portfolios become statistically insignificant after adjustment with either cost 
estimate. Naturally the cost-adjusted returns on momentum portfolios are even more significantly 
negative. In panel B, which compares raw returns and cost-adjusted returns of our replication 
results under the conventional sampling method, we observe that transaction costs are not 
sufficient to eliminate returns on winner portfolios. Under the transaction cost estimate of 
Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) loser returns become negative with 0.15% per month. For the 
relative-strength portfolios, adjusting for transaction costs eliminates the profits and returns 
become negative if the round-trip transaction costs is 1.09%. We suspect that net momentum 
profits reported in prior studies would be insignificantly different from zero once transaction 
costs are considered. 
<< Insert table 7 here >> 
 
6. Conclusion 
We find no evidence for a consistent momentum effect in the Australian equity market 
since the late 1970s. When we assume perfect-foresight in the sampling methodology we are 
29 
 
able to replicate results of prior studies in the Australian equity market that conflict with our 
results. The only difference between our methodology and these other studies is that we do not 
assume to be able to know in advance which stocks will cease to exist over the investment period 
Rather, we adopt a conservative approach of Henker et al. (2006) which assumes that those 
stocks were liquidated and hence had zero prices. We refer to this approach as „practical 
sampling method‟ because it did not need any perfect foresight of future delisting or acquisitions. 
We argue that previous research may underestimate the severity of their implicit assumption 
which leads to bias towards finding a momentum effect. Momentum returns are not robust to 
different sampling approaches. Consequently, future research needs to focus on the 
consequences of the sampling technique.momentum returns may simply be the product of a look-
ahead bias during the sampling process. This provides support for the weak form of the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
 Our study is the first to use all three Fama-French factors. We are able to collect book 
values for 86% of all companies listed on the ASX to make the calculation of book-to-market 
equity ratios possible. We find that the Fama and French model can only explain 4.7% of the 
variation of momentum returns in Australia. The model however is able to explain the returns on 
winners and losers portfolios. Finally, we showed that the momentum effect is also not robust to 
transaction costs. Given that our replicated momentum profits are of similar magnitude to 
previous research, we argue that momentum returns documented in existing studies may not 
exceed transaction costs. The findings are also additional supports to transaction cost 
explanations as well as the efficient market hypothesis. A limitation of our results is that we rely 
on existing estimates of institutional transaction costs in the Australian literature. They are 
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average costs which do not take into account the composition of specific momentum portfolios. 
Consequently, the cost-adjusted profits might be underestimated.  
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7. Appendices 
 
Figure 1: Time series of momentum returns 
The figure shows time series of 6-month holding period returns on overlapping momentum portfolio 
constructed using „practical sampling approach‟. The overlapping momentum portfolio is formed each 
month by ranking stocks over the past 6 months and holding for 6 months with one-month skip period 
(i.e. 6/1/6) for the period from January 1977 to December 2008. Returns on winner-minus-loser portfolios 
are raw returns (i.e. they are not adjusted for risk factors or transaction costs). 
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Table 1: Returns on non-overlapping momentum portfolios over entire sample period from 
January 1977 to December 2008. 
The table reports returns on non-overlapping portfolios constructed using „practical approach‟ that relaxes 
the assumption of „perfect foresight‟. The momentum portfolios are formed by ranking ASX300 stocks by 
continuously compounded returns at the end of each J-month formation period and grouping them into 
quintiles. The first quintile (winners) is the equally-weighted portfolio of best performing stocks while the 
bottom quintile is the equally-weighted portfolio of worst performing stocks (losers) over the past J 
months. In the next K months, momentum strategy would buy winners and sell the losers. The winner-
minus-loser (WML) portfolios are either formed immediately after ranking period or one month after 
ranking period. Average monthly returns on each strategy are reported along with the t-statistics in 
parentheses where *, ** and *** denote significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level. 
 
    No Skip Period One-month skip period 
𝐽 
  Holding Period (𝐾) Holding Period (𝐾) 
 
3 6 12 3 6 12 
3 Winner 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.007 
  
(3.102)*** (3.580)*** (2.732)*** (2.911)*** (3.636)*** (2.635)*** 
 
Loser 0.014 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.016 
  
(5.128)*** (5.816)*** (5.159)*** (4.881)*** (4.481)*** (4.262)*** 
 
WML -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 
  
 
(-2.898)*** (-2.998)*** (-2.342)** (-2.657)*** (-1.412) (-2.399)** 
6 Winner 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.006 
  
(2.464)** (2.198)** (2.456)*** (0.902) (2.546)*** (2.393)** 
 
Loser 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.002 0.010 0.016 
  
(4.807)*** (5.011)*** (4.888)*** (0.830) 3.794*** (5.105)*** 
 
WML -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 0.0002 -0.004 -0.010 
  
 
(-3.212)*** (-3.664)*** (-2.924)*** (0.092) (-1.636) (-3.554)*** 
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Table 2: Returns on overlapping momentum portfolios over the entire period 1977 – 2008 
The table reports returns on overlapping portfolios constructed using „practical sampling approach‟ that 
relaxes the assumption of „perfect foresight‟. The strategy is followed every month. Momentum portfolios 
are formed by ranking ASX300 stocks by continuously compounded returns at the end of each J-month 
formation period and grouping them into quintiles. The first quintile (winners) is the equally-weighted 
portfolio of best performing stocks while the bottom quintile is the equally-weighted portfolio of worst 
performing stocks (losers) over the past J months. In the next K months, momentum strategy would buy 
winners and sell the losers. The winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolios are either formed immediately 
after ranking period or one month after ranking period. Average monthly returns on each strategy are 
reported along with the t-statistics in parentheses where *, ** and *** denote significance at 90%, 95% 
and 99% level. 
 
    No skip period One-month skip period 
𝐽 
  Holding Period (𝐾) Holding Period (𝐾) 
 
3 6 12 3 6 12 
3 Winner 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.009 
  
(3.210)*** (3.578)*** (4.092)*** (3.339)*** (3.885)*** (4.025)*** 
 
Loser 0.014 0.016 0.0172 0.010 0.014 0.016 
  
(6.255)*** (6.439)*** (6.895)*** (4.715)*** (5.817)*** (6.443)*** 
 
WML -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 
  
 
(-3.978)*** (-4.551)*** (-5.137)*** (-2.251)** (-3.519)*** (-4.459)*** 
6 Winner 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 
  
(2.285)** (2.774)*** (2.805)*** (2.518)** (3.107)*** (2.720)*** 
 
Loser 0.014 0.016 0.0177 0.011 0.014 0.016 
  
(5.787)*** (6.042)*** (6.736)*** (4.767)*** (5.665)*** (6.360)*** 
 
WML -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 
  
 
(-4.527)*** (-4.616)*** (-5.565)*** (-3.128)*** (-3.845)*** (-5.162)*** 
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Table 3: Momentum effect before and after Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
The table reports average returns on 6/1/6 overlapping portfolios constructed using „practical sampling 
approach‟ that relaxes the assumption of perfect foresight. The strategy is followed every month. 
Momentum portfolios are formed by ranking ASX300 stocks by continuously compounded returns at the 
end of each 6-month formation period and grouping them into quintiles. The first quintile (winners) is the 
equally-weighted portfolio of best performing stocks while the bottom quintile is the equally-weighted 
portfolio of worst performing stocks (losers) over the past 6 months. In the next 6 months, momentum 
strategy would buy winners and sell the losers. There is one month „gap‟ between formation and 
investment periods. Average monthly returns on each strategy are reported along with the t-statistics in 
parentheses where *, ** and *** denote significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level. WML is average return 
on winner-minus-loser portfolios. 
 
 
Portfolios 1977 – 1992 1993 - 2008 
Winner 0.009 0.006 
 
(2.542)** (1.807)* 
Loser 0.023 0.008 
 
(5.352)*** (2.396)** 
WML -0.014 -0.002 
 
(-4.030)*** (-0.957) 
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Table 4: Replication results over the entire sample period 1977 to 2008 
The table reports average monthly returns on both overlapping and non-overlapping momentum 
portfolios. We replicate the „conventional approach‟ that ignores ceased-to-exist stocks during investment 
period. The only difference between this table and tables 5.1, 5.2 is in the sampling process. Panel A 
reports average returns on non-overlapping portfolios while panel B presents those for overlapping 
portfolios. t-statistics are reported in parentheses where *, ** and *** denote significance at 90%, 95% 
and 99% level. WML is average return on the winner-minus-loser portfolio. 
 
Panel A: Non-overlapping portfolios 
        No Skip Period One-month skip period 
𝐽 
  Holding Period (K) Holding Period (K) 
 
3 6 12 3 6 12 
3 Winner 0.007 0.0191 0.040 0.002 0.009 0.0248 
  
(3.474)*** 5.4444*** (7.415)*** (1.084) (2.652)*** (5.354)*** 
 
Loser 0.003 0.0079 0.025 -0.001 0.003 0.022 
  
(1.317) 2.397** (4.891)*** (-0.612) (1.080) (4.789)*** 
 
WML 0.004 0.0112 0.015 0.004 0.006 0.003 
  
 
(2.537)** (4.107)*** (3.697)*** (2.525)** (2.530)** (0.977) 
6 Winner 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.0054 0.008 0.014 
  
(2.759)*** (2.926)*** (3.892)*** (3.975)*** (2.961)*** (3.712)*** 
 
Loser 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.012 
  
(0.839) (0.629) (2.792)*** (2.307)** (1.638) (3.579)*** 
 
WML 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.0022 0.004 0.002 
  
 
(2.009)** (2.943)*** (1.382) (1.695)* (2.056)** (0.673) 
        Panel B: Overlapping portfolios 
       No Skip Period One-month skip period 
 
𝐽 
  Holding Period (K) Holding Period (K) 
 
3 6 12 3 6 12 
3 Winner 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 
  
(3.714)*** (4.099)*** (3.914)*** (4.082)*** (4.125)*** (3.757)*** 
 
Loser 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.007 
  
(2.332)** (2.336)** (2.820)*** (1.285) (2.173)** (2.792)*** 
 
WML 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.003 
  
 
(1.970)** (3.336)*** (2.862)*** (4.521)*** (3.988)*** (2.687)*** 
6 Winner 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.0113 0.009 
  
(3.989)*** (4.221)*** (3.488)*** (4.145)*** (4.106)*** (3.292)*** 
 
Loser 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.007 
  
(1.127) (1.888)*** (2.446)** (0.952) (1.688) (2.593)*** 
 
WML 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.0022 
  
 
(3.885)*** (3.580)*** (2.082)** (4.416)*** (3.875)*** (1.516) 
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Table 5: Momentum effect before and after Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
The table reports average returns on 6/1/6 overlapping portfolios constructed using “conventional 
sampling approach” that has the assumption of perfect foresight in place. The strategy is followed every 
month. Momentum portfolios are formed by ranking ASX300 stocks by continuously compounded 
returns at the end of each 6-month formation period and grouping them into quintiles. The first quintile 
(winners) is the equally-weighted portfolio of best performing stocks while the bottom quintile is the 
equally-weighted portfolio of worst performing stocks (losers) over the past 6 months. In the next 6 
months, momentum strategy would buy winners and sell the losers. There is one month „gap‟ between 
formation and investment periods. Average monthly returns on each strategy are reported along with the 
t-statistics in parentheses where *, ** and *** denote significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level. WML is 
average return on winner-minus-loser portfolios. 
 
Portfolios 1977 - 1992 1993 – 2008 
Winner 0.012 0.013 
 
(2.440)** (3.469)*** 
Loser 0.006 0.004 
 
(1.321) (1.051) 
WML 0.006 0.009 
 
(1.758)* (4.094)*** 
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Table 6: Sensitivity of momentum returns on the risk factors 
Returns on 6/1/6 overlapping portfolios (constructed „under practical approach‟) from January 1993 to 
December 2008 are regressed against the three factors of excess return on market, small minus big (SMB) 
and high minus low (HML) constructed based on Fama and French (1993). SMB is factor mimicking risk 
in returns related to size. HML is mimicking risk in returns related to book-to-market equity. Normal 
time-series regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are run. t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses in which *, **, *** denoted the significant levels of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. 
Panel A estimates one-factor model (equation 4). Panel B reports the estimates of model 5 and results on 
full set of Fama and French three-factor model (equation 6) are presented in panel C. 
 
Panel A: CAPM 
      𝛼 𝛽 Adjusted 𝑅2 
  Winners  -0.0025 0.9280 0.6179 
  
 
(-1.28)  (13.47)*** 
   Losers 0.00008 0.8325 0.4451 
  
 
(0.03) (11.44)*** 
   WML -0.0071 0.0975 0.0120 
  
 
(-3.06)***  (1.43)   
  
      Panel B: time-series regression of two-factor model 
   𝛼 𝛽 𝑠 Adjusted 𝑅2 
 Winners -0.0040 0.9106 0.0828 0.6312 
 
 
(-2.12)** (13.33)***  (3.00)*** 
  Losers -0.0017 0.8130 0.0925 0.4600 
 
 
(-0.67) (11.25)*** ( 2.42)** 
  WML -0.0069 0.0994 -0.0093 0.0123 
 
 
(-2.71)*** (1.46) (-0.22)   
 
      Panel C: time-series regression of Fama and French three-factor model 
  𝛼 𝛽 𝑠 𝑕 Adjusted 𝑅2 
Winners -0.0028 0.9171 0.1142 0.0687 0.6358 
 
(-1.53) (13.75)*** (3.26)*** (1.58) 
 Losers 0.0020 0.8333 0.1895 0.2115 0.4992 
 
(0.87) (11.78)*** (3.60)*** (3.33)*** 
 WML -0.0094 0.0858 -0.0742 -0.1414 0.0469 
 
(-3.68)*** (1.150) (-1.40) (-2.23)**   
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Table 7: Momentum returns adjusted for alternative estimates of transaction costs for the period 
1993 to 2008 
Panel A compares momentum returns before and after adjusted for different transaction costs for the 
period from 1993 to 2008. The strategy examined is overlapping 6/1/6. Practical sampling method was 
used such that no look-ahead bias is imposed in the sample. Panel B reports similar things except that 
portfolios are constructed with the assumption of “perfect foresight” for the period 1993 to 2008. The first 
column reports again the raw momentum profits. The second column reports momentum returns adjusted 
for estimate of round-trip transaction costs of 0.25% for both winners and losers. The costs are calculated 
based on the proportion of our turnover rates and that documented in Comerton-Forde et al. (2005). 
Similarly, the third column reports cost-adjusted momentum returns in which round-trip transaction costs 
are 0.548% and 0.552% for winners and losers, respectively. The costs are computed based on the 
proportion of our turnover rates and that documented in Comerton-Forde et al. (2006). Cost-adjusted 
returns on momentum portfolios are calculated by subtracting the total costs of winners and losers from 
the raw momentum profits. For cost-adjusted returns on winners and losers, the corresponding round-trip 
transaction costs are subtracted from raw returns. 
 
Panel A 
 
Cost-Adjusted returns 
 
Raw Returns Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) 
Winners 0.0055 0.0029 -0.00005 
 
(1.8068)* (0.9709) (-0.0161) 
Losers 0.0077 0.0051 0.0022 
 
(2.3962)** (1.6102) (0.6821) 
WML -0.0022 -0.0072 -0.0132 
 
(-0.9568)        (-3.1611)*** (-5.7641)*** 
    Panel B Cost-Adjusted Returns 
  Raw Returns Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) 
Winners 0.0131 0.0106 0.0076 
 
(3.4687)*** (2.7980)***  (2.0060)** 
Losers 0.0040 0.0015 -0.0015 
 
(1.0507) (0.3929) (-0.3837) 
WML 0.0091 0.0040 -0.0019 
 
(4.0948)*** (1.8191) (-0.8681) 
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